A New World In the Making? by Suttmeier, Richard P.
Science and Technology • 457
Richard Suttmeier is Professor of Political Science at the University of Oregon.
He would like to thank William Blanpied, Cao Cong, Shi Bing, and two anony-







While prospects for scientific and technological development vary across
Asian countries, most states in the region see science and technology as
critical for the achievement of national goals and are developing new poli-
cies for research and innovation. This chapter examines indicators of the
upward trend of technological development in Asia, and interprets these
in light of the globalization of science and technology, the growth of glo-
bal production networks in high technology fields, and the emergence of
new science-based industries. Of special note is the growing international
importance of China and India, and increasing intra-regional cooperation
in science and technology. These developments create new challenges for
the United States in reconciling the security interests of the war on terror-
ism with long-term interests in maintaining international leadership in sci-
ence and engineering.
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Introduction
In recent years, scientific and technological development throughout Asia
has attracted increasing attention in the United States. American surprise
at the growing sophistication of Japanese technology in the 1970s and
1980s has given way to admiration for the technological achievements of
the South Korean and Taiwanese economies, and more recently to attempts
to understand the depth and breadth of the scientific and technological
potential of India and China. As a recent report from the U.S. National Sci-
ence Foundation suggests, this attention is warranted:
A range of indicators traces a trend that shows growing competi-
tive strength in the Asian region outside of Japan, chiefly in China,
South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. Scientists based
in those countries produce a growing share of the S&T articles
appearing in the world’s leading journals, and development of
regional scientific collaboration (centered on China) is apparent.
These Asian economies have an expanding world market share of
high technology production. They have in place, or are institut-
ing, policies and incentives to retain their highly trained person-
nel, attract expatriates, or otherwise benefit from their nationals
working abroad, chiefly in United States.1
At the same time, the role of the United States in enabling scientific
and technological development in Asia also cannot be overstated. It helps
to create a mutuality of interests at work which, arguably, has not been
fully recognized, but which is likely to become far more important in pro-
viding political, economic, and cultural resources for U.S. interactions with
Asia. It is important that this mutuality be better understood to ensure
that, in the face of immediate concerns over the war on terrorism, it is not
squandered or dissipated.
A first step in enhancing understanding is to recall the historical roots
of modern science and technology (S&T) development in Asia. For many
of the countries of the region, these roots go back more than a century,
and grow out of humiliating encounters with the West. Although the tim-
ing and circumstances differed from country to country, the anger and frus-
tration from these encounters engendered fundamental questions of iden-
tity involving the role of S&T in culture, and the relationships between
S&T and the creation and maintenance of national wealth and power. Gradu-
ally, such questions became central themes in the ideologies of moderniza-
tion which have shaped the region, with the achievement of scientific and
technological capabilities becoming defining characteristics of what it means
to be “modern.” Whether it be imperial Russia, a new Soviet Union, post-
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independence India, China in its Republican or People’s Republican forms,
Meiji Japan, or Korea under military rule, modernizing elites have placed
the development of S&T high on their agendas. While wars, domestic
political turmoil, misguided policies, and cultural resistance have all slowed
the pace of S&T development in Asia, the fundamental equation of sci-
ence and modernity has acquired deep roots in belief systems throughout
the region. Thus, the evidence of growing scientific and technological ca-
pabilities that we now witness should not be surprising. These develop-
ments have deep ideological and emotional roots, and reflect decades of
policy initiatives and institution building.
But, while the countries of Asia have continued to build their capa-
bilities, S&T in the West has continued to evolve. Whereas the relation-
ships between the trajectory of scientific and technological development
in the West and Asia had been until recently rather oblique, these trajecto-
ries are now intersecting in important ways. The nature of that intersec-
tion is being shaped by the forces of globalization and by exciting new
developments in knowledge itself. The countries of Asia are attempting to
find those points of intersection through a variety of policy innovations
for research, human resource development, and for harmonizing domestic
industrial development with foreign investment.
Reconfigurations
To understand the nature of this intersection, it may be helpful to reflect
on an article appearing in a recent issue of Fortune magazine. Entitled “Big-
league R&D Gets Its Own e-Bay,” author David Kirkpatrick describes the
ways in which American pharmaceutical companies are outsourcing research
and development (R&D) work via the Internet. Using a global network of
R&D “solvers” registered with an Internet hub called InnoCentive, com-
panies can post requests for innovative solutions to problems at the
InnoCentive site and receive creative ideas by e-mail for which they will
pay, if useful, from $5,000 to $100,000. The objective is to use the Internet
to tap into technical talent, wherever it might be in global society. Regis-
tered “solvers” now number more than 50,000 in more than 100 countries.
While the greatest concentration of these remains in the United States, it
is expected that the number in China will soon surpass them.2
While this approach to research and innovation is unlikely to sup-
plant more conventional organizational arrangements, it does remind the
United States that in addition to the war on terrorism, other transformative
forces of globalization are at work, including major changes in the ways in
which knowledge is produced and utilized in support of national security
and economic objectives. For instance, as science and technology become
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among the more globalized of activities, the importance of spatial arrange-
ments to create and use knowledge successfully has had to be reconsid-
ered. Physical proximity for certain types of tasks has become relatively
unimportant, as growth in international co-authoring and the rise of “dis-
tributed” R&D activities among dispersed but networked scientists and
engineers illustrates. But there has also been a resurgence of spatial con-
centration, or “clustering,” of innovative activities in order to capture the
complementarities and “agglomeration” benefits of such activities.3
The Fortune piece demonstrates that the current era of industrial pro-
duction is structurally quite different from 20 years ago. Whereas efficiency,
technological development, and industrial prowess were once character-
ized by vertically-integrated organizational arrangements, current trends
indicate an age of de-verticalization in which the “value chain” of busi-
ness activities is broken into a number of components, or modules, which
are outsourced to specialists around the world. Components are then co-
ordinated electronically and reintegrated by leading innovative firms that
control the intellectual property rights (IPRs), standards, and “technologi-
cal architecture” of the high value-added products in the international
economy, or by sophisticated “contract manufacturing” firms which “re-
verticalize” the production process through globally distributed suppliers.4
As the Fortune account illustrates, knowledge creation itself can be modu-
larized in the operation of international production networks, a point dem-
onstrated by the growth of overseas R&D investments—increasingly in
Asia, with as many as 400 in China alone—by global technology leaders.
Finally, the Fortune article reminds us that intellectual and institutional
resources for S&T—once concentrated in Europe and North America—are
now more widely distributed around the world, with an increasing share in
Asia. A recent UNESCO survey of R&D trends during the 1990s indicates
that R&D expenditures in Asia, in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms,
increased from 23 percent of the world total in 1990 to 30.5 percent in 2000,
while those in North America declined slightly from 38.2 to 37.2 percent
and those in Europe shrunk from 33.9 in 1990 to 27.2 percent in 2000.5 Many
Asian countries are emerging as important reservoirs of talent, and are
becoming important nodes of innovation in a global network of knowledge
creation and utilization.6 These resources are being tapped for inclusion in
distributed R&D tasks, or form the bases for new regional innovation clus-
ters which are linked with clusters elsewhere in the world.
Most countries in Asia now regard their capabilities in S&T as central
to the military, economic, environmental, and security challenges they face.
While all understand that S&T capabilities do not provide sufficient con-
ditions for the proper management of these issues, they nevertheless re-
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gard them as fundamental for meeting critical goals. Most countries of the
region are also aware of an impending technological revolution involving
nanotechnology, biotechnology, new materials, and new energy and envi-
ronmental technologies (fuel cells, hydrogen, etc.). These new technolo-
gies are seen as important for solving pressing national problems, and in
shaping the direction of the global economy in the coming decades.7 Most
Asian countries want to be deeply involved—as leaders, or as gainful par-
ticipants—in what is perceived to be the coming industrial revolution.
In a world where security and well-being are increasingly dependent
on S&T, technical talent becomes a valued resource. The management of
human resources, therefore, becomes an especially important dimension
of S&T policies. However, decisions over who controls and manages high-
level human resources—and the institutional assets of national innova-
tion systems more generally—in key countries in the region, is an open
question at the moment. Claimants for these human and institutional re-
sources are divided between state and private interests, defense and civil-
ian interests, and national and multinational interests.
For many countries of the region, multinational corporations (MNCs)
have been more successful in extracting value from national technical re-
sources than national governments or national corporations. MNCs have
been both agents for the globalization of S&T, as well as a source of con-
cern to countries in the region uncomfortable with ceding their techno-
logical futures to actors only loosely accountable to national agendas. As
a result, discussions of the roles of S&T in Asia must recognize that MNCs,
along with states, are playing critical roles in the development of technical
capabilities in the region. While national political purpose is certainly evi-
dent in the national innovation systems of Asian countries, the impact of
foreign investment leads to the reconfiguration of scientific and techno-
logical development efforts in such a way that the “national” in “national
innovation system” requires qualification.8 It thus makes sense to approach
a discussion of S&T in Asia with reference to a highly contingent relation-
ship between national policy initiatives in support of national objectives
(“techno-nationalism”) and the new realities of “techno-globalism”—exten-
sive international cooperation in research and global partnerships for tech-
nological innovation.9
Puzzles and Ambiguities
While scientific and technological development in Asia is attracting atten-
tion, many significant questions of interpretation and assessment remain.
A recent World Bank study, for instance, suggests that despite the
build-up of national innovation systems, and S&T capabilities more gen-
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erally, most economies in the region still rely upon innovations from the
advanced industrial countries. In this view, most countries of Asia face
significant challenges of devising creative public policy to improve sec-
ondary and tertiary education, encourage innovative firms to co-locate in
support of technological agglomeration, and to further exploit the oppor-
tunities available from information technology. At the same time, the study
also acknowledges that pockets of excellence are emerging in the region,
with signs that indigenous innovation is beginning to take root.10 Other
data call attention to notable technical achievements in the region and
growing contributions to the world stock of knowledge.11
Interest in the development of “knowledge-based economies”12 has
underscored the importance of national innovation systems, and we see in
most countries attention shifting from an older “science and technology
policy” orientation to a more inclusive “innovation policy” approach which
is cognizant of many of the institutional and cultural issues pertaining to
knowledge economy development. At the same time, a number of other
institutional, infrastructural, and cultural factors seem to be necessary in-
gredients, along with innovative capacity, for the development of a knowl-
edge-based economy. Skeptics argue that these conditions are not being
met in most countries of the region. Others point to the renewed efforts to
deploy modern information technologies and promote use of the Internet.
In Table 1, we see trends in expenditures for the promotion of information
and communication technology (ICT) and in Table 2, we see patterns of
Internet penetration. Both indicate considerable regional diversity, but with
trends indicating commitments to greater “informatization.”
As discussed further below, given the importance of S&T for national
objectives, it is not surprising that Asian countries have been seeking to
reform and revitalize their S&T systems. The reforms have been concerned
with strengthening national basic research capabilities, establishing new
incentives and institutional arrangements for linking research to the
economy, finding new mechanisms for meshing the national innovation
system with trends toward the globalization of research and innovation,
strengthening capacities for international cooperation in science, and re-
thinking the relationships between military-related research and the civil-
ian economy. Reforms appear necessary to move these countries to posi-
tions of greater capability for research and innovation, but questions re-
main as to their political viability and the speed which they can be effected.
With the growing concern for international cooperation in research and
innovation, and the national initiatives for strengthening S&T in the re-
gion, questions about intra-regional research cooperation and regional
technological integration have also become important. As seen in Table 3,
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intra-regional research cooperation is increasing, as Japan continues to be
the central focus while China is becoming a more important collaborator.
Efforts to assess the growth of a regional system of S&T cooperation
must consider how the regional fits with the global. As suggested above,
sources of innovation for countries in the region still typically originate
outside the region among global leaders, and this is true both for commer-
cial technologies and academic research. While ties with the United States
still constitute the main extra-regional relationship, the European Union has
taken the tasks of international scientific and technological cooperation
with Asia quite seriously, and has been seeking to strengthen commercial,
academic, and governmental S&T relations. An especially important factor
linking the regional to the global is the critical role played by diasporic
communities of scientists and engineers in North America and Europe—
especially from India and China—as agents of high technology develop-
ment and research collaborators in cutting-edge fields.13
Table 1. ICT Expenditures (share of GDP)
             1992 1996 2000 2001 2002
China 1.9 3.1 5.4 5.7 5.8
India 1.7 1.8 3.8 3.9 2.8
Japan 5.7 6.4 8.3 9.6 5.3
Malaysia 4.7 5.4 6.8 6.6 7.3
Russia 1.5 1.7 3.7 3.3 3.7
Singapore 6.8 7.3 9.7 9.9 6.5
South Korea 4.9 5.9 6.6 7.4 6.5
Thailand 2.9 2.9 3.6 3.7 4.7
Vietnam 2.2 4.1 6.5 6.7 2.4
Source: World Development Indicators, World Information Technology and Services Alliance,
International Data Corporation.
Table 2. Internet Penetration (users per 1,000 people)
             1996 1998 2000 2001 2002
China 0 2 17 26 46
India 0 1 5 7 16
Japan 44 134 299 384 449
Malaysia 9 69 214 265 320
Russia 3 8 20 29 41
Singapore 82 191 324 412 504
South Korea 16 68 414 521 552
Thailand 2 8 38 58 78
Vietnam 0 0 3 12 18
Source: World Development Indicators, International Telecommunication Union, World Tele-
communication Development Report and Database.
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The linkage between technology and national security figures promi-
nently in the S&T programs of many Asian countries, but also generates
its own puzzles. Since the end of the Cold War, many Asian S&T programs
have shifted toward emphasizing the importance of developing high tech-
nology, high value-added civilian production. This is not to say that mili-
tary needs have been ignored. However, there seems to be a growing real-
ization that dedicated military programs have only limited utility in the
absence of a strong, technologically sophisticated civilian industrial base.
This realization has been reinforced by the performance of U.S. forces in
the Gulf wars and in the Balkans. The lesson seems to be that the where-
withal for modern warfare involves systems employing know-how and de-
vices whose sophistication is derived from commercial competition. The
appearance of a “dual-use” mentality, though, carries with it risks associ-
ated with the development and dissemination of dual-use technologies—
risks which have become considerably more serious in an age of terrorism.
Throughout the 1990s, most countries in Asia saw the enhancement
of their scientific and technological capabilities in terms of devising na-
tional strategies for exploiting the opportunities presented by globaliza-
tion and the systemic changes it engendered. The policies of the U.S.
government, the accessability of U.S. research universities, and the activi-
ties of U.S.-based MNCs have been among the more powerful forces be-
hind globalization and the promotion of what we have called techno-
globalism. While these forces clearly are still at play, it is also true that a
rethinking of U.S. national security interests prior to September 11 had
already begun a process of questioning the wisdom of an unqualified
techno-globalism.14 Since September 11, and the initiation of the war on
terrorism, these concerns have come into sharper focus, and the dynamics
of globalization have been altered. The significance of these changes for
Table 3. Intra-Asian Research Collaboration, 1986–97
1986–88 1995–97
Instances of # co-authored Instances of # co-authored
collaboration articles collaboration articles
Japan 1,009 8,259 3,308 21,608
China 415 2,626 2,808 7,982
South Korea 191 686 1,139 3,892
Taiwan 157 754 599 2,813
Singapore 62 318 423 1,147
Thailand 134 493 381 976
Malaysia 70 249 270 554
Philippines 96 247 219 454
Source: National Science Foundation, 2000. Cited in Shahid Yusuf, Innovative East Asia:
The Future Growth, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003, p. 211.
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Asia is complex, and the implications are subtle and by no means obvious.
It is clear, for instance, that the smooth movement of professional man-
power across national borders is important for techno-globalism, and that
post-September 11 immigration policies are raising disturbing problems for
this type of mobility. At the same time, there are a variety of countervailing
forces continuing to promote the dynamics of globalization. These coun-
tercurrents raise complex policy issues, discussed below.
Diversity of Experiences
The levels of scientific and technological development of the countries of
Asia are quite different, as are efforts to build effective twenty-first cen-
tury national systems of innovation. Hence, the ways in which the puzzles
surrounding the region’s scientific and technological development mani-
fest themselves in particular countries vary considerably. Some common-
alities exist, however, and it will therefore be useful to consider the diverse
national experiences in the region in terms of the following categories.
Global Innovator
With its large economy, technological depth, and established research tra-
dition, Japan stands somewhat apart from other countries in the region.
As indicated in Table 4, Japan has one of Asia’s largest R&D workforces,
with the number of research personnel per 1,000 workers in economy be-
ing among the world’s highest.
Japan also excels in terms of its expenditures on R&D as a percentage
of GDP, which are second only to the United States in absolute terms.15
Most other countries in Asia pale by comparison, as seen in Table 5.
Japan’s capacity for innovation is perhaps best symbolized by its
patenting activity. Japanese innovators dominate the competition among
Asian countries for U.S. patents, and rank second overall to those in the
United States in receiving U.S. patents (the number of U.S. patents in 2001
awarded to Japanese innovators, 33,223, dwarfs those awarded to Chinese
innovators, 195). Seven of the top ten companies awarded U.S. patents in
2001 were Japanese (one was South Korean).16 While Japan is thus a world
leader in innovative activities, distinctive aspects of its national innova-
tion system set it apart from other OECD countries, and some of these
features have been the source of policy concerns over the past two de-
cades, as discussed further below.
Strategic Science Powers
The three large continental powers, China, India, and Russia, are referred
to here as “strategic science powers.” Although there are major differences
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among them, their S&T systems have long shown some interesting simi-
larities.17 They are all rich in technical talent, as Table 4 indicates, and have
extensive systems of S&T institutions which were built up over many de-
cades. Important to note, though, is that these were established originally
1) in non-market contexts, and 2) initially were strongly oriented toward
performing important strategic national security missions.18 The pursuit of
these missions have left a legacy of achievement in atomic energy and
nuclear weapons, space, other military technologies, and some areas of
basic research, but much less in the way of innovative commercial prod-
ucts. However, the combination of market reforms and the reach of global-
ization into these countries creates significant new conditions for the work
of R&D systems, and in some ways is having the effect of “unlocking”
the potential of under-utilized resources and talents.
While all of the strategic science powers have large numbers of re-
search scientists and engineers, in both China and India, research person-
nel still account for a very small percentage of the total workforce. As seen
in Table 5, expenditures on R&D in Russia and China are increasing, al-
though with somewhat different patterns. At the time of the breakup of the
Soviet Union, Soviet expenditures on research and development exceeded
2 percent of GDP, and were comparable to levels seen in the OECD coun-
tries. These expenditures plummeted dramatically in the early 1990s, but
are gradually increasing, reaching 1.24 percent in 2002. In the Chinese case,
the ratio of gross domestic expenditure on research and development as a
percentage of GDP (GERD/GDP) remained quite low during most of the last
25 years of economic reforms, but has been growing steadily since the late
1990s.19 It reached 1.29 percent in 2002. At this level, Chinese R&D expen-
ditures, in PPP terms, had grown to the world’s third largest, after the United
States and Japan, according to the OECD. In the Indian case, we have not
yet seen the kinds of significant increases in the GERD/GDP that are evi-
dent in China and Russia; expenditures have remained below one percent,
Table 4. R&D Personnel (Full-Time Equivalent), 1997–2002
Researchers (thousands) Researchers per 1,000
1997 2000 2002 1997 2000 2002
China 588 695 810 0.8 1.0 1.1
Japan 625 647 675* 9.2 9.7 10.2*
Russia 532 506 491 8.2 7.8 7.5
Singapore 9 16 18 5.3 7.9 9
South Korea 102 108 136* 4.8 5.1 6.3*
Taiwan 47 55 59* 5.2 5.8 6.4
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 2003; *Indicates figure is for 2001.
India data for 1997 are 1998 figures, data for 2000 are 1999 figures.
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reportedly reaching just 0.84 percent in 2001, but India’s 2003 report on
“Science and Technology Policy” calls for the GERD/GDP to reach at least
2 percent by the end of the 10th Plan (2002–2007).20
The strategic science powers, especially Russia, can claim many im-
pressive technical achievements. However, their innovation systems were
ill-adapted to the creation of innovative and technologically dynamic civil-
ian economies, or for exploiting opportunities in the international economy.
With the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, and the initiation of eco-
nomic reforms, first in China, then in Russia and India, the national inno-
vation systems of the strategic science powers have been undergoing re-
forms to make them more suitable to serve the needs of market economies.
Although many of the institutional and human resources from the pre-re-
form systems have proven to be ill-suited to new circumstances, many others
are becoming important reservoirs of talent, facilities, and traditions of re-
search and training excellence that give the strategic science powers a
special niche in Asia, which warrants particular attention. As these assets
get combined with the talents of new generations of internationally-trained
scientists and engineers, with the managerial skills and incentive struc-
tures of MNCs, and with the financial resources now available from na-
tional governments, national firms, and increasingly, MNCs, we are likely
to see the birth of an important new early twenty-first century model of
scientific and technological development of great international importance.
Fast Followers
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have seen steady and relatively rapid
development of their S&T resources over the past 20 years. Starting from
positions far more under-developed than the “strategic science powers,”
they have pursued human resource development and research policies that
generally have been synchronized with creative combinations of state in-
Table 5. Gross Domestic R&D Expenditure, 1997–2002
Expenditure ($bn PPP) Expenditure (% of GDP)
1997 2000 2002 1997 2000 2002
China 25.4 48.5 72.1 0.7 1.0 1.3
India 13.2 20.0 ... 0.6 0.7 0.8
Japan 90.8 98.3 103.8* 2.8 3.0 3.1*
Russia 8.9 11.1 14.2 1.0 1.1 1.2
Singapore 1.1 1.8 2.1 1.5 1.9 2.2
South Korea 16.2 18.9 22.0* 2.7 2.7 2.9*
Taiwan 7.9 10.3 10.9* 1.9 2.1 2.2
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 2003. *Indicates figure is for 2001;
India figures from UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, 2004.
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dustrial policies and market discipline. As seen in Tables 4, 5, and 6, they
are becoming important players in research and innovation.
Relying heavily on low-cost labor and imported technology during
earlier phases of industrialization, the fast followers began to see their
competitive advantages slipping away in the 1980s and realized that the
future of their economies would require greater knowledge intensity and
higher value-added production. They therefore strengthened higher edu-
cation, including the introduction of graduate programs, and built up more
sophisticated national innovation systems involving both government-
sponsored research and policies to strengthen R&D in industry.The chal-
lenges of devising effective strategies for scientific and technological de-
velopment are especially acute for the fast followers since they are subject
to economic pressures from both global technological leaders and, at the
low end, from low-cost manufacturers. An especially telling case is that of
Taiwan, which has seen the gradual migration of much of its successful
semiconductor manufacturing industry to China. Taiwanese authorities are
attempting to keep the higher value-added activities of the industry in
Taiwan and, in addition, the government has been actively supporting R&D
in biotechnology and nanotechnology to stimulate new science based in-
dustries.21 But, here too we see the squeeze, as Japan (as well as the United
States and other European OECD countries) gear up for the new indus-
tries, while China not only enjoys low-cost manufacturing advantages, but
has a relatively sophisticated research system which is already deeply in-
volved in such fields as biotechnology and nanotechnology.
Notable in all three of the fast followers, but especially in Singapore
and Taiwan, was the introduction of special science parks to encourage
clustering, technological entrepreneurship, and the incubation of new high
technology firms. As seen in Table 5, all three of the fast followers now
have GERD/GDP ratios above 2 percent, with R&D personnel constituting
an increasing percentage of total employment, as seen in Table 4. Indeed,
in many ways, the term “fast followers” requires qualification, given that
they now have leading roles in global high technology industry, are en-
gaged in internationally cutting edge research in selected fields, and take
an increasing share of U.S. patents.22 In South Korea, high technology
products now account for more than 30 percent of total manufacturing
output, well above most other OECD countries including the United States,
where the figure is just under 25 percent.23
Slower Starters
Most of the ASEAN countries (other than Singapore) have experienced
much slower development of their national innovation systems. All have
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seen considerable technological progress over the course of the past 15
years as a result of foreign technology transfers. However, their endow-
ments of technically-trained human resources, institutional assets for S&T,
and traditions of R&D trail those of countries in the other three catego-
ries.24 This situation has dampened technological learning and made the
slower starters more dependent on MNC technologies transferred to the
region in connection with the surge of foreign investment in the late 1980s
and the early 1990s. Most of the slower starters felt the full brunt of the
Asian financial crisis, but have begun to devise distinctive strategies of
“local technological accumulation” to capture greater value from their
positions in global production networks. These include government poli-
cies for “technological deepening” (e.g., policies to encourage the strength-
ening of technological capabilities of small and medium-size enterprises),
for the co-location of foreign-invested design, engineering, and R&D ac-
tivities with manufacturing facilities, and for the clustering of MNC activi-
ties in particular industries. One observer refers to the these strategies as
“post-national industrial policy.”25
Contingencies
Despite many differences, countries in all four categories are facing a
number of critical questions about their national innovation systems. Most
of these, in one way or another, are driven by the challenges and oppor-
tunities of new technologies (especially in biotechnology, nanotechnology,
and new information technologies), and by those presented by globaliza-
tion and the spread of international production networks. How these ques-
tions are handled in the near future will have important effects on the per-
formance of the national innovation systems and their roles in global re-
search and innovation processes.
Institutional Reform
The challenges of institutional reform vary from country to country. Nev-
ertheless, they are prominent for S&T policy agendas of virtually all coun-
tries. In the Japanese case, for instance, a system that had served it so
well for catching up with the West began to show real problems under
conditions of technological parity with global leaders, especially in light
of Japan’s prolonged deflationary experience of the past decade. Japan’s
financial and labor market arrangements, for example, produced stable, long-
term commitments on the parts of both workers and employers which had
been “ ... conducive ... to the accumulation of firm-specific human skills
and the close intra-firm (and intra-corporate-group) information sharing,
which made continuous technological innovation easier.”26 However, these
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successful practices of the past have proven to be inappropriate for the
new challenges and opportunities presented by science-based industries
and changing international production networks.27
Concerns for Japan’s competitiveness under these new conditions,
thus, have called attention to the adequacy of a number of inherited insti-
tutional arrangements; in particular, the nature of university-industry rela-
tions, the IPR regime, market conditions for labor and finance to support
of new startup firms, and the “R&D boundary of the firm” issues.28 Japan
has seen reform in all of these areas, with a new national approach to IPR
policy, the development of a new stock market supportive of high technol-
ogy start-ups, a growth in S&T cooperation agreements among companies
and with universities and research institutes, and changes in the univer-
sity system which make cooperation with industry much easier.29 At the
policy level, the role of S&T has been significantly strengthened by the
establishment of the position of minister of state for science and technol-
ogy and a new National Council for Science and Technology Policy.30
The problems of institutional reform in the strategic science powers
have been alluded to. They start with basic problems in the political
economy that stem from reforming socialism, but also involve long-stand-
ing issues of establishing effective working relationships between the re-
search sector (long characterized by the prominence of free-standing gov-
ernment research institutes) and industrial sectors which have a tradition
of resisting innovation and investing in R&D. Thus, a much greater share
of the national R&D expenditure in Russia and India still comes from gov-
ernment and goes to public research institutes than is the case in the OECD
countries. That was true in China as well, until the latest round of reforms
began to gain traction. With more than 60 percent of the national R&D
effort now coming from the industrial sector, China is beginning to look
more like the OECD countries in terms of the sectoral distribution of R&D
expenditures.31 There are signs, however, that change is occurring in India
and Russia as well. In India, for instance, even though the GERD/GDP has
not increased notably, the share coming from private industry has increased
from only 13.8 percent in 1990–91 to 21.6 percent in 1998–99.32
The slowness of structural reform in Russia—especially with regard
to industrial research—is striking when compared with China. While re-
forms in the industrial research system in China have also been (and con-
tinue to be) very difficult, notable progress is now evident. Chinese enter-
prises, which now face increasingly stiff market competition, have begun
to take the challenges of technological innovation far more seriously. As
noted above, China reports that more than 60 percent of the national R&D
effort is now supported by industry, and demand for technological inno-
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vation is far more evident today than just a few years ago. In addition,
hundreds of public research institutes that had been under industrial min-
istries (a classic feature of the Soviet model), have now either been merged
into enterprises or have become enterprises themselves, including 242
important national research institutes. In Russia, by contrast, it has been
difficult to do away with government supported public research institutes;
there were still 4,089 of them in 1999, down only 12 percent from 4,646 in
1990. The Russian government was still supplying more than 50 percent of
the country’s R&D funds, and Russian industry still seemed quite reluc-
tant to take up the challenges of technological innovation. Reportedly, only
6 percent of Russian enterprises engaged in innovative activities in 1998.33
The problems of institutional reform in all three of these countries are
daunting and rooted in the most fundamental political problems the three
governments face. Thus, even after two decades of serious S&T system
reforms in China, many institutional problems persist—ranging from higher
education curriculum and university governance problems to serious dis-
tortions in the financial system, corruption, and a widespread lack of so-
cial trust. The persistence of such problems detract from the contributions
which should emanate from the country’s large pools of talent.34 Similar
institutional problems are found in Russia and India as well.
In spite of the considerable differences among the individual coun-
tries of the region and different categories of countries, there is a remark-
able similarity among them with regard to reform objectives. Many of these
objectives are inspired by admiration for the successes of the U.S. system.
To one degree or another, the reforms are concerned with the kinds of is-
sues William Blanpied has identified as important for Japan: developing “a
strategic approach to government research investments; building a com-
petitive research environment; enhancing the independence and mobility
of young researchers; improving the research evaluation system; utilizing
research outcomes by promoting cooperation among the academic, indus-
trial and government research sectors;” and building public support and
understanding for science by “enhancing communications with society.”35
Spending Levels and Priorities
A second crucial issue faced by all countries in the region involves levels
of spending on science and technology, and the purposes to be served by
this spending. This takes a number of different forms.
First, there is a question of the research intensity of the economy that
is summarized by the GERD/GDP statistic. Most Asian countries have felt
a need to increase research intensity and push up the GERD/GDP, although
doing so often means dealing with arguments favoring acquisition of us-
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able technologies through international technology transfer instead. The
sectoral distribution of expenditures is also an issue. The pattern for the
global innovators has been for industry to assume an ever larger share of
the national R&D expenditure burden, typically more than 60 percent. Vari-
ous countries in the region—Japan, Korea, and China—have all been fol-
lowing this pattern, but many others do not. The question of levels of in-
dustrial research is also evident in other countries and is manifest in deci-
sions about whether to conduct R&D in-house or seek technical coopera-
tion with other firms or research centers with complementary knowledge
assets. This involves the critical question of university-industry relations,
an important and difficult matter of institutional reform in most countries.
While the level of commitment to research by industry is an important
issue for all Asian countries, they all also recognize the importance of gov-
ernment expenditures, especially with regard to the high risks associated
with frontier research in the new technologies. The question here involves
the levels of effort to be given to R&D in support of public goods—typi-
cally with regard to defense, agriculture, public health, the environment,
and basic research—and the role of targeted R&D programs in support of
national high technology aspirations. With regard to basic research, it has
been a political challenge in a number of the countries to enhance expen-
ditures on basic science after long periods when applied R&D were critical
components of catch-up strategies. For Japan, the fast followers, and the
strategic science powers, basic research has taken on a new importance in
light of the prospects for new science-based industries emerging out of
biology, material science and nanotechnology, and information technology.
Making the transition from applied research traditions to greater sup-
port for basic research is complicated by the strategic national S&T pro-
grams in a number of the countries. These relatively well-funded efforts
are intended, through focused research expenditures, to keep the techni-
cal communities of the various countries competitive as active researchers
in support of new science-based industries. The initiation of such national
programs, while welcomed by many researchers, also have raised ques-
tions about the capabilities of governments to direct programs of original
research “from above,” in contrast to bottom-up, investigator-initiated re-
search favored by many scientists.
Most countries of the region have also initiated various research plan-
ning exercises intended to mobilize resources in support of strategic re-
search opportunities. Typically, these plans lay out research objectives,
develop manpower projections, set spending targets, and include measures
for institutional reform to address some of the problems noted above. An
especially interesting planning exercise at the moment is China’s effort to
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devise a long-term, 15-year plan for the 2005–20 period. Involving some 20
working groups, the plan is expected to be the foundation for moving China
toward international scientific and technological distinction by 2020.
Intellectual Property Rights
The globalization of science and technology and the development of sci-
ence-based industries has made the protection of intellectual property rights
a matter of intense international attention. IPR concerns have taken on
greater importance for most countries in the region and are evident in their
research and innovation policies. In Japan, the patent system is undergo-
ing extensive reform while China is seeking to significantly enhance its
capabilities to protect IPR, not only as part of its obligations as a new
member of the World Trade Organization, but also to protect its own inno-
vators. Indeed, efforts to establish indigenous intellectual property claims
are a central part of China’s post-WTO technology policy.36
In his recent analysis of the challenges facing Russian S&T, Alfred
Watkins calls particular attention to the confounding problems of IPR in
Russia’s efforts to transform its national system of innovation. The prob-
lem is not solely one of widespread pirating (as in China), or ambivalence
about the imposition of new IPR standards by a global regime (as in In-
dian concerns over WTO obligations),37 although both concerns are
present in Russia as well. It is more a problem of ambiguities over intellec-
tual property, who owns it, and how it should be exploited for commercial
purposes. The problem stems largely from the significant achievements of
the Soviet research system, and the lack of suitable institutional mecha-
nisms during the Soviet era for defining IPR and providing for their pro-
tection. Since discoveries and inventions derived from public investments,
Russia is trying to decide whether the technical knowledge produced dur-
ing the Soviet period should belong to the Russian state, or not. If so,
how should it now be made available for commercial exploitation? If the
Russian state continues to be the principal supporter of R&D, should it
continue to hold ownership of intellectual property and, if so, how will
commercial value be appropriated from the progress of research?38
In ways that are reminiscent of Chinese frustrations over their own
problems of turning scientific research findings into profitable products,
but which are far more poignant in the Russian case, there is deep unease
about Russia’s inability to capture commercial value from notable intellec-
tual achievements. This unease is heightened by the knowledge that the
value of these intellectual achievements is instead being exploited by for-
eign companies, the beneficiaries of an outflow of Russian scientists and
engineers resulting from the dreadful conditions for science in the initial
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post-Soviet years. At the same time, the unsettled and ambiguous state of
IPR has threatened the kinds of foreign investment and joint venture for-
mation which promises to stimulate Russian high technology industry, in
much the same way as it did in China.
Managing Foreign Investment
A central issue faced by most countries in the region is how to respond to
foreign investment and how local research and manufacturing capabilities
should fit into the production networks of the global economy. Foreign
investment, and accompanying transfers of technology and managerial
capabilities, have been critical factors in the technological development of
the region. At the same time, the countries of Asia typically have pursued
aggressive national industrial policies motivated by a deep sense of techno-
nationalism and a desire to avoid technological dependency. Most now
realize, however, that effective national S&T policies that do not conform
to the realities of globalization are not likely to succeed. We thus see the
widespread employment of strategies throughout the region which con-
form to what Atsushi Yamada has called “neo-techno-nationalism.”39 Such
policies are intended to enhance national S&T capabilities in order to im-
prove the national position in an international division of labor which is
largely set by the global innovators. The challenge is a daunting one, but
cases of success are evident throughout the region.
Nevertheless, the specter of technological dependency hangs over
most Asian countries and creates a fundamental ambivalence about for-
eign investment. This is especially true as global innovation leaders seek
to employ the best and brightest in the region through the outsourcing of
increasingly sophisticated professional services and the establishment of
R&D centers throughout the region. Such activities clearly enhance local
knowledge and facilitate participation in high value-added production, but
they also draw off valuable human resources which could be employed in
support of national research and industrial development activities.
Social Relations of Science
The dominant interest in scientific and technological development in Asia
has been to foster high technology development and national strength.
Voices concerned with the social relations of science, and with what might
be called the “science for what?” question have not, until recently, been
especially notable. This may now be beginning to change in a number of
the countries. The recent Indian election was a reminder that a vast under-
developed country still exists side by side with a high-tech “India shin-
ing.”40 In China, we see a similar reconsideration of developmental trajec-
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tories, albeit not expressed through democratic elections. In both coun-
tries, thoughtful members of the political and technical elites are asking
questions about a better deployment of S&T to overcome problems of
underdevelopment, and to manage the issues symbolized by ideas such as
the digital divide.41 Such concerns are evident in other countries as well.
Severe environmental degradation throughout Asia, and a growing envi-
ronmental awareness in the region are also making the “science for
what?”question one that is becoming difficult to avoid, especially in the
face of the looming technical problems associated with critical energy-en-
vironment dilemmas, and new political dynamics associated with growing
tendencies toward democratization in the region.
Finally, the social and ethical impacts of new technologies are getting
increasing attention. As the successful experimentation with human clon-
ing in South Korea and Japan’s recent decision to permit limited research
on therapeutic cloning illustrate, the social relations of science are becom-
ing far more salient in national S&T policy deliberations. Among other is-
sues, differing ethical interpretations of technological possibilities may make
the harmonization of regulatory systems for new areas of research more
difficult. This, in turn, could privilege countries with more liberal interpre-
tations of what types of research is ethically acceptable. More permissible
attitudes toward stem cell research in Singapore and China, for instance,
have had the effect of attracting scientists from other parts of the world,
including the United States, where more restrictive rules are in place.
Quality and Culture
In many countries of the region, there is also considerable concern about
the conduct and quality of research. As R&D budgets increase, so have
expectations as to the significance of the work being supported, in large
part because of disappointments that much research is derivative and
unoriginal. In a series of articles appearing in Nature this past spring, a
number of distinguished Chinese researchers working abroad offered cri-
tiques of Chinese science, calling attention in particular to the persistence
of cultural attitudes of excessive deference to authority and conformity,
which discourage critical thinking.42 In response to the articles on China,
C.P. Rajendran of India’s Center for Earth Science Studies, Akkulam, ar-
gued that Indian science too is plagued by the persistence of deferential
attitudes and acceptance of hierarchy.43 Similar concerns are heard else-
where in the region, as reformers struggle to change higher education and
research environments in order to stimulate creativity—or, perhaps more
accurately, to change institutional arrangements which dampen the creativ-
ity of research personnel, especially young scientists.44
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Implications
The growth and diffusion of scientific and technological capabilities in Asia
have a number of important implications in a world affected by the U.S.-
led war on terrorism. Some of these are rather direct; most, however, are
somewhat more oblique.
Role of Asia in International Science
In the first instance, the growing Asian scientific capabilities are having
important effects on international science. This is evident in such output
measures as contributions to the world scientific and engineering litera-
tures, the growth of patenting, and the expansion of high technology ex-
ports.45 With strong government support for science, and with steadily
improving institutions for higher education—and some cases, institutions
with long-standing international reputations for excellence—Asian educa-
tional systems are making notable contributions to the global supply of
scientists and engineers, as Table 6 indicates.
Most of those in the cohorts of new graduates, of course, remain in
their home countries where they are advancing the research enterprises
and technological levels of the domestic economies. They anchor the do-
mestic innovation systems and serve as the local counterparts of research
and engineering personnel from Europe and North America. A small, but
significant proportion of those in these manpower pools develop careers
in international science and play important roles in research and advanced
training in leading corporate, academic, and government research centers.
Of growing importance is a third group, the members of which are playing
increasingly important roles in bridging activities at the global research
centers with those of the national innovation systems in the region—as
visiting professors, holders of special academic appointments, and as key
managers of MNC knowledge production in Asian countries.46
Role of Asia in Global High Technology
Asia plays an increasingly important role in high technology trade. It is
the growing source of many high-tech products and absorbs high tech-
nology exports from Europe and United States. The combined high tech-
nology exports from China, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Tai-
wan, for instance, increased from roughly 8 percent of the world’s total in
the early 1980s to almost 28 percent in 1999.47 However, a central issue in
the role of Asia in global high technology is that of the terms of trade,
reflected in debates throughout the region on the relative and absolute
gains from trade in high technology products.
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As the impressive developmental experiences of most Asian countries
indicate, notable absolute gains have been realized from participation in
the global high technology economy. However, relative to the gains made
by global high technology leaders, whose investments in the region have
been so important to stimulate economic growth and technological devel-
opment, these absolute gains are sometimes seen as disappointing, unfair,
or both, in large part because the terms of trade are largely the result of a
production system designed and controlled by those outside the region.
It is for this reason that IPR issues have become so important—those who
control the IPR enjoy significant economic advantages48 and structural
power.49 Thus, much sharper focus is being given to enhancing the inno-
vative capabilities of national firms through the encouragement of increased
R&D, other incentive programs, and restructuring. Clearly, the ability to
alter the terms of trade vary considerably from global innovator Japan, with
its demonstrated success in doing so, to the slower starters. For the latter,
it will be decades before strong traditions of advanced science and engi-
neering education and research excellence are established, and until then,
a measure of technological dependency is unavoidable. Nevertheless, ag-
gressive policy responses designed to assimilate technology and enhance
human resources can improve their relative positions.
The relative gains/absolute gains issue is more complex and more in-
teresting as it affects the strategic science powers, the fast followers, and
the relationships between these two categories of countries. The fast fol-
lowers have clearly indicated considerable sophistication in changing the
terms of trade and moving up the value chain in global production net-
works. In selected areas of high technology, they are establishing them-
selves as original innovators and have also begun to build world-class
scientific research projects in selected fields. On the other hand, they are
under enormous pressures from lower-cost producers in the region and
from the ongoing flows of innovation emanating from the global innova-
tors in Europe, North America, and Japan.
Table 6. Earned Doctoral Degrees, 1991–2000
All Fields Science/Enginnering
1991 1995 2000 1991 1995 2000
China 2,556 4,364 11,383 1,198 3,417 7,304
India 8,374 9,070 ... 4,212 4,000 ...
Japan 10,758 12,645 15,357 3,874 5,205 7,089
South Korea 2,984 4,462 6,143 1,135 1,920 2,865
Taiwan 410 848 1,400 370 650 931
United States 37,534 41,743 41,340 24,022 26,536 25,951
Source: National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators, 2004.
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For the strategic science powers, the relative gains/absolute gains
challenge plays itself out in somewhat different ways. In all three, there is
a consciousness that their large well-established research systems should
be generating streams of innovation for new products and processes, per-
mitting new opportunities for absolute gains. On the other hand, the per-
sistence of institutional obstacles from the pre-reform era frustrate the re-
alization of these aspirations, and work to reinforce their subordinate po-
sitions in global production networks and the international division of la-
bor. The enormous pools of inexpensive labor in India and China, and the
natural resource endowments of Russia strongly influence natural compara-
tive advantage and deflect attention from efforts to break out of positions
of technological subordination through research and industrial policies.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, all three are also taking the challenges of
building innovative capabilities from their R&D establishments much more
seriously, and in all three IPR concerns figure prominently.
One of the more interesting issues to be monitored for understanding
the directions of S&T in Asia is the relationships that develop among the
strategic science powers and between them and the fast followers. The
potential for the latter is perhaps most evident with China as it builds a
variety of commercial, governmental, and academic S&T relationships with
South Korea, as Taiwan’s information technology (IT) industry becomes
ever more intertwined with that of China’s, and as Singapore and China
pursue more intimate ties (as illustrated, for instance, by the employment
in Singapore of Chinese researchers, many of whom have received ad-
vanced training in the United States). Relations among the strategic sci-
ence powers are also intriguing, as shown in the exploratory patterns of
cooperation between the IT industries in India and China, and in Sino-
Russian cooperation in defense technologies.
Regardless of the development of relations between the strategic sci-
ence powers and the fast followers (and, indeed, among the strategic sci-
ence powers themselves), the strategic science powers are sure to play a
more important role in global high technology development. MNC global
technology leaders are showing increasing interest in the science and
engineering talent found in the strategic science powers and seek to ex-
ploit the professional achievements and cost advantages they offer. There
is much potential to save on personnel costs through outsourcing of R&D
and professional services to countries such as China and India. Whereas
the salary of an engineer in the United States may average $70,000, a com-
parably skilled and educated counterpart would average only $25,690 in
China, and an enticing $13,580 in India, according to one estimate.50 MNCs
have been developing more sophisticated commercial intelligence to iden-
Science and Technology • 479
tify opportunities to invest in these talent pools, and we are seeing an
increase in outsourcing of R&D and sophisticated technical services to
these countries to the point where the future health of the research and
innovation enterprises in United States is questioned.51
Security Issues
The evolution of science and technology in Asia carries a number of impli-
cations for security. However, these are not all entirely straightforward. On
one hand, national programs to enhance technological capabilities com-
bined with gainful participation in international production networks are
raising general technological levels that cannot help but be supportive of
the defense industrial bases in the region. Capabilities in support of dual-
use technologies will surely improve, positive spillovers for defense tech-
nologies can be expected, and technological resources of use to terrorists
are likely to become more available.
At the same time, the current trajectory of scientific and technological
change in Asia is very much tied to the dynamism of civilian economies
and the play of market forces. While dedicated military programs continue
to be important for countries in the region, there seems to be a widespread
recognition that military modernization through such programs cannot be
achieved in isolation from a dynamic civilian economy. Thus, if the enhance-
ment of technological capabilities is inseparable from active participation
in the global economy, we should expect that the fundamental political
orientation of countries in the region should be toward de-emphasizing
defense policy and promoting instead domestic reform and the international
institutions supporting liberalized trade and investment.
Yet, should priorities change as a result of altered perceptions of the
security environment, military modernization programs would be a more ef-
ficient and effective process once they are part of a more vibrant civilian
technological system. Thus, the relationships between national security
programs and civilian research and innovation activities bear watching. For
instance, a Chinese space program embedded in a technologically dynamic
civilian economy is likely to be far more effective than the high priority
strategic weapons programs of the past, which were isolated from the ci-
vilian economy, and where the economy itself was far less dynamic. Espe-
cially in the strategic science powers, there is also an interesting issue
dealing with the diffusion of knowledge through institutional and informal
personal networks linking civilian activities and security programs.52 Given
the important roles that the latter played in the scientific and technological
development in these countries, and that a number of scientists and engi-
neers who are now playing key roles in the civilian economy came out of
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such programs, it would only be natural to assume that there is a fair de-
gree of diffusion and cooperation occurring.
A special set of security issues pertain to Russian science and the
employment of scientists out of the weapons programs of the former So-
viet Union. Special programs—such as the Civilian Research and Devel-
opment Foundation and the International Science and Technology Cen-
ter—initiated by the United States, the countries of Western Europe, and
Japan, have attempted to support Russian researchers in the pursuit of
peaceful avenues for science, and to prevent their recruitment into clan-
destine weapons programs being sponsored by states or non-state actors.
A further reinvigoration of the Russian innovation system in support of a
more competitive civilian economy will work to reinforce these objectives.
Challenges and Opportunies for the United States
The security implications for the United States from the enhancement of
Asian technological capabilities take various forms. Countries of the re-
gion can use strengthened technological capabilities to improve their own
military positions. A major concern in the United States at the moment is
Chinese efforts to use information technologies to enhance China’s ability
to prevail in asymmetric conflicts. On the other hand, more sophisticated
technological capabilities in the hands of traditional allies, such as Japan,
have led—and will continue to lead—to opportunities for mutually benefi-
cial cooperation with the United States on defense technologies.
Growing scientific and technological sophistication in Asia also, in-
evitably, means that dual-use technologies will be further diffused through-
out the region, and will be more available to non-state actors bent on hos-
tile acts. The 1995 Aum Shinrikyo gas attack on the Tokyo subway sys-
tem, involving the cooperation of technically trained individuals and delu-
sional fanatics, is a reminder of the vulnerability of society to the misuse
of scientific and technical knowledge. In an age when a range of new tech-
nological opportunities are emerging from exciting new fields of science,
but in the context of a global terrorism threat, there is clearly a need for
much more attention to the security of R&D and production facilities and
to effective policies for regulating potentially harmful substances, devices,
and processes. There is much the United States could do by working with
the countries of Asia to disseminate best practices in these areas. At the
same time, it will be a challenge to all parties to ensure that the pursuit of
new levels of security does not compromise traditions of open exchange
on which creative science and successful innovations depend.
Construing security implications more broadly, it is useful to recall that
countries in Asia face a number of national problems that are characterized
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by 1) having significant technical content, and 2) important transnational
implications which ultimately affect the United States. These include mat-
ters of agriculture, public health, energy, and the environment. The United
States maintains important bilateral relations with a number of countries in
the region that address some of these issues. As the problems themselves
become more significant, especially the complex interrelationships among
energy supplies and global environmental change, the United States should
be using its ties with the countries of Asia to build on the growing capa-
bilities in the region for more enhanced cooperation in the face of these
challenges. The U.S. government maintains active S&T cooperation agree-
ments with Russia, India, China, Japan, and Korea, and these all provide
opportunities for cooperation with countries in the region on these signifi-
cant problems. As Asian capabilities increase, so too will opportunities for
mutually beneficial research.
In many ways, though, the most important implications for the United
States of the growth of S&T capabilities in Asia involves the health of the
U.S. system of innovation. There is a growing body of thought in the United
States that future economic well-being and national security are depen-
dent upon the maintenance of U.S. comparative advantage in advanced
S&T development.53 If this assumption is true, then we must be asking
ourselves whether the growing technological capabilities of Asia are best
seen as imposing new competitive challenges or as a source of new op-
portunities. In many ways, they are both.
The health of the U.S. innovation system has long been improved by
the many contributions made by scientists and engineers from around the
world to its academic science and industrial research. The countries of Asia
send the greatest number of foreign students to the United States, a large
percentage of these are in science and engineering, and many remain in
the United States in academic and industrial positions. But, as the innova-
tion systems in Asia improve, including the improvement in Asian institu-
tions of higher education, it is inevitable that the institutions of the U.S.
innovation system will increasingly be in competition with their Asian
counterparts for these talents.54
This is a competition in which the United States should prevail, but
the extent of the challenge must be appreciated. We should recognize, in
the first instance, the extent to which the U.S. economy, and the opportu-
nities for employment it generates, is based on science and engineering.
Since 1980, for instance, the number of science and engineering positions
in the U.S. labor force has risen more than four times faster than employ-
ment opportunities in general.55 Foreign-born scientists and engineers have
played an important role in filling these positions as the appeals of study-
482 • Strategic Asia 2004–05
ing science and engineering among U.S.-born students has declined. The
science and engineering workforce, however, is now experiencing the same
sort of aging as the population as a whole, with more than 50 percent of
the scientists and engineers comprising it now 40 years of age or over.
Thus, over the next two decades, there will be a rapid growth in retire-
ments from this segment of the labor force.56 It is difficult to see how re-
placements can be found without increasing reliance on foreign-born tech-
nical personnel, especially those from the countries of Asia. But, with the
growth of increasingly sophisticated research enterprises and knowledge
intensive economies in Asia, opportunities for Asian-born scientists and
engineers at home will surely increase.
The changed post-September 11 security environment makes the chal-
lenge significantly more complex, especially regarding employment of for-
eign-born technical personnel in sensitive management positions in gov-
ernment and industry, and in sensitive fields of research. The problems of
developing an immigration policy which successfully reconciles redefined
national security objectives and traditions of scientific openness further
complicates matters. Post-September 11 changes in U.S. immigration policy
have led to an increase in the denial of visas to highly skilled individuals,
and have apparently also discouraged applications from such individuals.57
Thus, at a time when economic and demographic changes are creating more
demand for scientists and engineers from Asia, and when opportunities in
Asia are improving, the effects of the war on terrorism for immigration policy
may be undermining long-term U.S. competitiveness. It will become increas-
ingly difficult to maintain a winning position in the competition for high-
quality human resources if scientists and engineers from the region are
faced with long and demeaning visa processes to enter the United States.58
The visa problem, however, may be symptomatic of a larger, more pro-
found issue of state-society relations in the United States and in Asia it-
self. As many observers have noted, globalization has the potential for
eroding state sovereignty and weakening the state relative to other inter-
national actors. But, as the war on terrorism reminds us, we still look to the
state for security against the worst forces of globalization. Inevitably, how-
ever, a reassertion of state interests may run counter to those of other
societal actors. Many of the latter are important players in the national
innovation system, with strong vested interests in globalization. Thus, with
regard to the visa issue, we see American universities and U.S. high tech-
nology firms—leading agents in the globalization of S&T—being most
affected by this reassertion of classic sovereign prerogatives of protect-
ing borders and ensuring security.59 The perennially contentious policy
realm of export controls also illustrates this point, especially in the recent
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history of U.S.-China relations, where state judgments of U.S. national
security interests are often at odds with those of private sector judgments,
and where the former often seem to be insensitive to the consequences of
controls for the strategic technological trajectories of the private sector.60
While the visa problem is not exclusively a problem for the countries
of Asia, its effects have been felt most extensively in connection with those
countries.61 Not only do the largest number of foreign students in science
and engineering come from Asia, so do many business partners. A recent
study of the effects on U.S. companies of post-September 11 immigration
policies, which puts the dollar cost to U.S. firms of these new immigration
procedures at more than $30 billion, noted that U.S. visa applications for
business travel have been most troublesome for applicants from China, In-
dia, and Russia, with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea being ranked next.62
Thus, the growing S&T capabilities of Asia, and the globalization of
which they are a part, call for a major re-examination of assumptions about
the relationships among trade, technology, and security. Prior to the war
on terrorism, and in spite of traditions of government-industry and gov-
ernment-academia tensions, a reasonable equilibrium existed between state
and societal interests in arriving at balanced understandings of such mat-
ters as export controls, international scientific cooperation, educational
exchanges, and high technology trade. As the leading sponsor of the glo-
balization of S&T, the United States could view this historical trend with
the confidence that U.S. interests were being served. Understandably, the
September 11 attacks required a reassertion of the state’s security role. The
launching of the war on terrorism, as the operationalization of this
reassertion, would inevitably disturb the equilibrium.
The difficulty for the United States is that global processes other than
the war on terrorism also have profound effects for U.S. well-being. While
not entirely independent of the war on terrorism, they nevertheless have a
logic and dynamism of their own. The changing shape of S&T in Asia is
highly representative of these processes. The equilibrium, noted above,
worked to position the United States favorably for the management and
control of these processes. The loss of that equilibrium requires that a
workable new equilibrium be found. As noted above, one of the more im-
portant geo-political implications of the trends in Asian S&T is toward the
acquisition of scientific and technological capabilities for commercial gains
and civilian purposes. Put slightly differently, the national innovation sys-
tems of most countries in the region have been notably reoriented toward
capturing gains from globalization in ways that, in general, de-emphasize
national defense as the primary focus of technological development. It is
in U.S. interests to reinforce that tendency. Doing so, however, requires
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that any drift toward a more exclusive and protective techno-nationalism
in the United States be checked.
Critical requirements for the globalization of S&T have been the tradi-
tions of excellence found in the U.S. national system of innovation, espe-
cially those of the great research universities and leading corporations.
But, in addition, access to these traditions enjoyed by the best and bright-
est from around the world as a result of welcoming immigration policies
ensured the continued centrality of the United States, even as capabilities
became more widely diffused globally. While foreign governments and cor-
porations have unquestionably gained from the costs borne by the United
States in sustaining these traditions, the benefits for the United States far
outweighed the gains realized by others. The United States, thus, faces
tragic losses if, in the face of the immediate challenges of fighting the war
on terrorism, it neglects the necessary measures required to maintain sci-
entific and technological excellence, including its traditions of free and open
international travel and exchange.
Conclusion
Asian countries regard S&T development as critical for managing the car-
dinal economic, security, and environmental challenges they face. As a re-
sult, new policy commitments in support of the development of research
and innovation capabilities are evident throughout the region. These com-
mitments come with a recognition that:
• S&T is among the world’s most globalized activities
• The world is poised for a new industrial revolution resulting from
advances in biotechnology, information technology, and nano-
technology/materials science
• The structure of the international high technology economy is
undergoing profound changes resulting from the introduction of
global production networks.
All major countries of the region are making adjustments to their na-
tional innovation systems to accommodate these realities in ways which
will allow them to both strengthen national indigenous technological ca-
pabilities as well as to better exploit opportunities resulting from the chang-
ing global division of labor. The nature of these adjustments, however, vary
considerably among those who qualify as “global innovators,” “strategic
science powers,” “fast followers,” and “slower starters.”
The enhancement of S&T capabilities in Asia has a number of pro-
found short- and long-term implications for United States. On one hand,
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such capabilities will contribute to military modernization in a number of
countries in the region, principally through industrial development with
dual-use implications. Capabilities for turning dual-use technologies toward
weapons development will increase, and it will be important for the United
States to monitor these developments and attempt to create incentives to
discourage this direction of technological development. It will also be im-
portant for the United States to work with countries in the region to de-
velop safeguards for the protection of lethal technologies resulting from
new areas of research.
The encouragement of technological development paths emphasizing
civilian use, however, will strengthen the countries of the region as poten-
tial commercial competitors, and developments in this area may be of far
greater significance for the United States over the longer term. At a time
when the war on terrorism has once again elevated security concerns to
the top of policymakers’ list of priorities, it is especially important that these
problems of competitiveness not be minimized. They call for creative new
forms of cooperation among government, the corporate world, and univer-
sities to ensure continued U.S. leadership in scientific research and tech-
nological innovation. Such leadership, however, is increasingly dependent
upon the creative contributions of scientists and engineers from the coun-
tries of Asia. But changes in U.S. immigration policy are directed at pre-
cisely those countries of Asia which are helping to supply the personnel
for academic research excellence and creative industrial R&D.
Throughout most of the past 50 years, the United States has been
able to use its dominant position in science and technology to advance its
interests by providing access to its scientific assets and technological re-
sources, and in some cases, controlling or denying it. However, with the
diffusion of scientific and technological capabilities around the world, and
especially into Asia, there has been a decline in the relative dominance of
the U.S. position, as centers of excellence emerge elsewhere. This trend
will only increase. Successful policies of using science and technology in
support of U.S. interests can no longer be based solely on the promise of
access to distinctive technical assets. Policies of access control, under con-
ditions of globalization, will prompt those denied access to seek technical
assets—higher education opportunities and opportunities for research col-
laboration, as well as high technology equipment—from other suppliers.
The continuation of policies of denial and access control without deft new
countervailing policies to exploit the realities of globalization invite fail-
ures and loss of U.S. influence. The needed redirection of U.S. policy,
however, will be a daunting task, requiring widespread attitudinal change
among policymakers and some significant government restructuring.
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Just as countries in Asia are undergoing extensive reforms in antici-
pation of further globalization and a new technological revolution, so too
must the United States not allow its current focus on the war on terrorism
to divert attention from institutional reforms needed to address other cen-
tral challenges of globalization. As a start, the United States should ac-
cord a much higher position to the role of S&T in foreign policy generally
and to relations with Asia in particular. It needs a high-level mechanism to
integrate information about developments in academic and industrial re-
search, the activities of the government’s own technical agencies, trends
in international science and technology, and foreign policy challenges. Such
a mechanism should have the powers to shape this information into policy
supportive of long-term U.S. interests. The United States still enjoys a rich-
ness of institutional resources to make such restructuring successful, but
it has lacked the political leadership and confidence necessary for the more
radical restructuring that the new circumstances demand.
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